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Lost in Translation: Interpreting and Implementing Anti-Social 
Behaviour Policies 
 
Roger Matthews and Daniel Briggs 
 
Introduction 
Tackling anti-social behaviour has over the last decade become a 
government priority. The establishment of the Anti-Social Behaviour 
Unit in the Home Office in 2003, and, more recently the formation of the 
Respect Task Force signals the strategic shift in official policy on law and 
order. As the officially recorded crime rate continues to drop there has 
been no let up in government pressure to maintain ‘law and order’ with 
the passing of a number of pieces of legislation designed to control the 
range of activities which have become identified as anti-social behaviour 
 
In this process, there has been a shift in terminology and the meaning of 
key terms such as ‘disorder’, ‘crime’ and ‘anti-social behaviour’ with a 
blurring of the distinctions between them. These terms are increasingly 
coming to be used interchangeably while terms like ‘disorder’ which once 
referred mainly to physical disorder such as vandalism to the control of 
problem drinkers such as street drinkers, youths or vagrants and 
prostitutes. There is also a growing belief that these social forms of 
disorder should and can be controlled through law enforcement (Hope, 
199X). The conceptual slippage involved in current debates about crime, 
disorder and anti-social behaviour does not, however, detract from the 
significance given to these various activities, but rather serves as a self-
reinforcing discourse that increases their profile and allows inflated 
claims to be made about their cumulative impact.   
 
There is, however, a discernable shift in emphasis which is taking place 
involving a decreased concentration on crimes as specific events to a 
focus on anti-social behaviour and disorder as low level continuous 
activities which extend beyond the established crime control framework 
and which require a form of control which moves conventional policing. 
It necessarily requires a series of agencies working in combination 
involving forms of regulation which goes beyond the established 
boundaries of criminal justice. James Q. Wilson and George Kelling 
(1983) have provided the most effective rationale for linking disorder and 
anti-social behaviour to crime in their influential and widely referenced 
‘Broken Windows’ thesis, which posits an ‘inextricable link’ between 
disorder and crime (See Matthews and Pitts, 2001; Kelling, 2001). In 
official circles, this thesis has been used consistently to justify the need to 
‘get tough’ on anti-social behaviour and to nip low-level incidents ‘in the 
bud’ before they become more serious. 
 
The growing focus on anti-social behaviour by the government has not 
occurred without critical comment from academics and journalists. 
Leading academic commentators on these issues have seen the increased 
focus on anti-social behaviour as a shift in a more punitive direction. One 
of the main reasons given for the increased focus on anti-social behaviour 
has been the ‘perceived inefficiency of the criminal justice system’ 
(Burney, 2005). Similarly, Peter Squires and Dawn Stephen (2005) claim 
that the increased preoccupation with anti-social behaviour is a function 
of the perceived ‘enforcement deficit’: 
 
“This ‘enforcement deficit’ concerns the fact that traditional 
criminal justice interventions tend to individualise their response 
around particular incidents and offenders and have no mechanism 
for addressing the collective and accumulating impact of harm and 
distress across a community” (Squires and Stephen, 2005: 3) 
 
Squires and Stephen argue that this new focus has involved a shift away 
from attempts to address the condition of the disadvantaged through 
welfare policies and strategies of social inclusion and replaced this with 
an over reliance on discipline, punishment and containment.  
 
In this chapter, we seek to examine the ways in which those ostensibly 
punitive and disciplinary policies have been interpreted and implemented 
in the past few years in England and Wales. Drawing on the research 
conducted in three London boroughs in 2006, we aim to explore the gaps 
between the rhetoric and reality and between interventions and 
outcomes1
 
. In doing so, we aim to argue that there are substantial 
difficulties and inconsistencies in the implementation of anti-social 
behaviour strategies. Although this is paper focuses on a relatively small 
number of boroughs which were seen to be ‘failing’, many of the issues 
discussed in this paper are relevant to many other boroughs in which we 
have recently visited. 
The main problems arose in the process of translating government policy 
to local areas included: 
 
• Variations in the use and reliability of data collected; 
• Problems of definition and the overlaps of categories; 
• Different perceptions of anti-social behaviour among different 
agencies; 
• Problems of formulating a strategy of intervention; 
• Limited use of anti-social behaviour sanctions; 
• Lack of community involvement. 
 
In a recent press release issued in January 2007, the Home Office claimed 
that: “One year on from the launch of the Government’s Respect Action 
Plan, major progress is being made in the drive to tackle anti-social 
behaviour and create a modern culture of respect.”2
 
 The press release 
points to the increased use of Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs), 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and Parenting Orders. It also 
includes a quote from Tony Blair in which he claims that: 
 “We have seen real progress with communities across the 
country making full use of the powers we have put in place with 
councils, police, courts and local people working in partnership 
to make neighbourhoods safer and better places to live.” 
 
While not denying that the millions of pounds, the substantial growth of 
anti-social behaviour personnel and the prioritisation of anti-social 
behaviour as an issue have all had some impact on anti-social behaviour. 
But we want to suggest that in a number of areas that the rate of progress 
is exaggerated and that the campaign against anti-social behaviour is 
being driven forward by a myopic and messianic vision which indicates 
little awareness of the real obstacles to the implementation of this 
programme.  
 
Variations in the use and reliability of collected data  
 
The starting point for understanding the nature, trends of anti-social 
behaviour issues in any borough is the gathering and collating of the 
appropriate data. In the three boroughs we examined, the quality of data 
collected ranged from poor to very poor. Typically, different agencies 
operated with different databases which drew data from different sources, 
employed different categories and were mostly incomprehensible. One 
borough, for example, used a combination of FLARE, CADMiS, 
iQUANTA, and CRIS.3
 
 Some data was collected by the police and some 
by the Housing Departments while other data were gleaned from calls 
received from members of the community.  
The data received from members of the community was not sifted or 
‘cleaned’ with the result that one incident might have involved ten or 
twenty calls by different residents. Despite the fact that there was often 
duplication of calls. It is also widely known that some groups of residents 
are more active and vocal than others. Anti-social behaviour Units, 
however tend to use calls rather than incidents as their point of reference 
in deciding on interventions and the formation of policy. Because calls 
rather than incidents were used it was very difficult to assess the clear up 
rate and effectiveness of different interventions. It is, however, almost 
certainly the case that ‘hard-to-reach’, marginalised and transient groups 
who are predictably those who are most likely to be victims of anti-social 
behaviour are those less likely to report incidents. 
 
 None of the anti-social behaviour officers in the three boroughs were 
very clear about the type of data they required to develop anything 
resembling a problem-solving or strategic approach to anti-social 
behaviour. Instead they relied uncritically on whatever datasets were 
available and drew on whatever forms of data on anti-social behaviour 
which was most readily available from the data analysts. The data 
analysts, for their part, tended to supply that data which was the easiest to 
access despite any limitations it might have. In one borough, responses to 
anti-social behaviour were decided upon by anti-social behaviour officers 
walking around the borough and talking to local residents. While this 
indicated a commendable desire to keep in touch with the experiences of 
local residents it hardly provided the basis for developing a rational 
policy programme. 
 
Since data was being collected on all three boroughs by different agencies 
using different data systems there was a high likelihood that many 
incidents were being double or treble counted. Although we did not trace 
through specific incidents in order to identify how they appeared on the 
different data systems there was a very high likelihood that those 
incidents, which cut across the crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour 
divide were recorded in different ways by different agencies using 
different data systems. If this process is particularly pronounced in certain 
boroughs it makes a virtual nonsense of the datasets produced by each 
borough for its audit. 
 
The problems of definition and the overlapping of categories 
 
Much has been written on the problem of definition in relation to anti-
social behaviour. Commentators have repeatedly pointed to the vagueness 
of the wording of anti-social behaviour legislation and policy 
programmes and the overlap with the categories of crime and disorder 
(Burney 2005: Squires and Stephen 2005). The Home Office have made a 
feeble and unconvincing attempt to ‘refine’ the categories of anti-social 
behaviour reducing them from a ragbag of sixteen categories to a 
typology of four general categories: misuse of public space; disregard for 
community/personal well-being; acts directed at people; and 
environmental damage (Home Office, 2004). While this four-fold 
typology serves to differentiate acts directed at people such as abuse, 
bullying intimidation, and the like, from environmental issues such as 
graffiti and litter, other offences such as ‘harassment of neighbours’ and 
inconvenient/illegal parking which are grouped under ‘misuse of public 
space’ could just as easily be grouped under other headings. Indeed the 
four-fold typology does not provide a level of consistency and clarity 
which makes better sense of the standard list of the sixteen offences. 
Where as the sixteen offences are too specific and inflexible, the four-fold 
typology is too general and imprecise for the formulation of data, 
undertaking analysis or developing interventionist strategies. 
 
While it is the case that the vagueness of the standard definitions of anti-
social behaviour makes it difficult to clearly delineate exactly what is 
mean by anti-social behaviour, the imprecise nature of the definition has 
the benefit that it can be widely interpreted and considerable discretion 
can be exercised by those agencies who are charged with addressing this 
issue.  
 
We should note, however, that the problem of definition is not specific to 
anti-social behaviour. The categories of crime, for example, are no more 
or less robust than many of the anti-social behaviour categories. The term 
‘violence’, for example, is extremely broad and subject to considerable 
degrees of interpretation. The same can be said of other categories such 
as robbery and theft (Matthews, 2001; Young 1988). It is just that we 
have become familiar with these crime categories and attribute them a 
sense of solidity and precision which in fact they do not have. 
 
It could be argued that some of the anti-social behaviour categories are 
more reliable and easier to measure than certain categories of crime. The 
number of youths ‘hanging around’, the number of cars abandoned and 
incidents of graffiti, as well as the number of beggars on the street, can be 
counted with relative ease. Despite this, even the Respect Task Force and 
those that carry out research on their behalf have shied away from 
measuring incidents of anti-social behaviour and claim that “the scale and 
impact of anti-social behaviour can only be measured by grouping the 
perceptions of those whose lives are affected by such behaviour” (Ipsos 
MORI, 2007). In presenting a review of trends in anti-social behaviour 
MORI engage in an interesting slippage between ‘perceptions’ and the 
‘reality’ of anti-social behaviour. They state: 
 
“Much is written about the Perception Gap in relation to crime; 
i.e. the perception of crime as measured by surveys is much greater 
than the reality (as measured by official police records). However, 
when it comes to many of the issues which make up anti-social 
behaviour, then in the absence of “official” records, perceptions 
are the only measure of reality. Indeed, by definition, this should 
be the case. If we are defining anti-social behaviour as “behaviour 
which causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to 
one or more persons not in the same household, then the critical 
measure is that of the negative impact on others” (Ipsos MORI, 
2007: 7) 
 
This statement is an extraordinary, as it is disingenuous. There is no 
objective reality and the type of empirical surveys on anti-social 
behaviour (which MORI have themselves conducted) are apparently 
redundant. Although ‘anti-social behaviour’ like ‘crime’ is asocial 
construction it does not mean that it has not objectivity.  
 
In our study, however, the main issue which arose in relation to the 
problem of definition was which agency was to take primary 
responsibility for addressing the issue. Who would take responsibility for 
deciding which measures were best suited for dealing with specific 
issues? Without clear lines of responsibility and accountability there is a 
real danger that the issue falls between a number of stools. 
 
Different perceptions of anti-social behaviour among different 
agencies 
 
The significance which different agencies attached to different forms of 
anti-social behaviour was found to vary considerably. There were two 
major divisions in the three boroughs reviewed. The first was between the 
Community Safety Teams and the Housing Department. The other was 
between what were identified as enforcement agencies on one hand and 
welfare or caring agencies on the other. 
  
The division between Housing Departments and Community Safety 
Teams is a product of a historical shift from identifying anti-social 
behaviour as a form of activity located mainly in local authority housing 
estates involving noisy neighbours and the like to an increasing focus on 
the regulation of public space. Indeed, there is a deep division in some 
boroughs between the Housing Departments and Community Safety 
Teams in terms of areas of responsibility, management structures and the 
forms of anti-social behaviour which are prioritised. In one borough, 
which was visited the Housing Department and Community Safety Team 
shared little common ground, exchanged virtually no information, used 
different datasets and worked in completely different buildings.  
 
The split between Housing Departments and Community Safety Teams is 
reflected in the schism which runs through many partnerships which 
divides anti-social behaviour between that which occurs in public spaces 
(streets, parks, etc.) and that which takes place in ‘private’ spaces such as 
housing estates. 
 
There is also a pronounced difference in the attitudes towards anti-social 
behaviour amongst Youth services, Social Services, and Educational 
Departments on one side and the police on the other. In general, the 
former group argue for predominantly welfare responses to people in 
trouble and take objection to the ‘criminalisation’ of certain activities by 
the police. Although each borough formally signed up to a ‘partnership 
approach’ and inter-agency working, the partnerships tended to gravitate 
towards a ‘stick and carrot’ approach which neither satisfied the 
welfarists or the police. The police often expressed frustration at what 
they saw as ‘soft’ policies of the welfarists, while these groups 
complained of the ‘heavy handed and insensitive’ ways in which the 
police and Anti-Social Behaviour officers responded to what were seen as 
generally low-level incidents carried out by young, disadvantaged and 
marginalised groups (see Matthews et al. 2007). 
 
Problems of formulating interventionist strategies 
 
The lack of accurate and reliable data as well as the difficulties in 
partnership working created problems in developing effective 
interventionist policies. Consequently, many of the policies which were 
developed in the three boroughs were reactive. Alternatively, they were 
easily swayed by political imperatives and priorities. Because each 
borough lacked a robust and objective dataset that could form the basis of 
rational policy programme, issues that were highlighted by the media, the 
Home Office or local politicians could all too easily change the direction 
of policy. Consequently, policy programmes were rarely sustained or 
consistent. Although routine procedures were established for dealing with 
things like litter, graffiti and abandoned cars policies on most other forms 
of anti-social behaviour varied immensely over time with issues that were 
priorities at one time moving down the agenda at other times, irrespective 
of the objective prevalence of the issue. 
 
Responses in each of the boroughs were therefore inconsistent and 
patchy. For many issues, there was a lack of clear strategy or tactics, and 
instead policies were proposed because they fitted with the general 
council objectives and priorities or because they were seen to be 
politically correct. Thus, forms of anti-social behaviour which were 
known to have relatively low number of victims or offenders in the 
borough were given priority whether or not they reflected the real 
concerns of residents. 
 
Because interventions were largely reactive, inconsistent, patchy and 
based on ‘feel-good’ factors, the impact was often short-term. There was 
little consideration of the causes of anti-social behaviour in each of the 
boroughs and the focus was mainly on achieving government targets or 
realising local government priorities. Potential central government 
funding was always a consideration and while there were some attempts 
to respond to local concerns, reference to actual or potential funding 
possibilities was a significant element in the discursive exchanges 
between practitioners. 
 
Limited use of anti-social behaviour sanctions 
Over the past few years, an impressive array of sanctions have been 
developed to deal with anti-social behaviour including Acceptable 
Behaviour Contracts, Anti-social Behaviour Orders, Parenting Orders, 
Housing injunctions, Fixed Penalty Notices, Penalty Notices for Disorder, 
Closure Orders (Crack houses), Dispersal Orders, Demoted Tenancies, 
Individual Support Orders, as well as the introduction of special powers 
for intimidating witness and drug-related civil orders to attach to ASBOs. 
 
In the boroughs we examined, as well as offices we have visited in the 
course of our research, it was apparent that the development of the 
various sanctions available was uneven and very selective. As the recent 
report by the Youth Justice Board has indicated the use of sanctions 
tended to be more a function of the attitudes and preferences of the 
agencies involved rather than being tailored to the specific situation or 
context of the offenders involved (Solanki et al., 2006). 
 
In the three boroughs, there were found to be considerable variation in the 
form of anti-social behaviour, which were targeted, and in the sanctions 
used. In one borough, sanctions were developed against street prostitutes 
while in other boroughs such sanctions were felt to be inappropriate for 
this group (see Sagar 2007). Aggressive and persistent beggars were 
found to be dealt with in conflicting ways in the three boroughs, with two 
boroughs using a combination of ASBOs and dispersal orders, while in 
another they were simply moved on by the police and neighbourhood 
wardens.  
 
The available range of sanctions, however, were not fully deployed in the 
three boroughs. Although, ABCs and ASBOs were becoming more 
widely used with two boroughs having issued seventeen and 20 ASBOs 
respectively, the third borough had only issued eight ASBOs. One 
borough had issued ten dispersal orders while the other two had issued 
none and one. Similarly, one borough had issued eight times as many 
Parenting Orders than the other two boroughs put together had issued 
over the previous twelve month period (see table 1) 
 
Table 1 - Number of ASB sanctions used in each borough from 
March 31st 2005 to April 1st 2006 
ASB 
sanctions 
Borough 1 Borough 2 Borough 3 
ASBOs 17 8 20 
Crack house 
closures 
6 181 4  
Dispersal 
Orders 
1 0 10 
Evictions 5 0 6 
Injunctions 10 3 3 
Parenting 
Orders 
40 3 2 
Curfews 6 0 23 
Supervision 
Orders 
42 0 45 
ABCs/ABAs 94 188 36 
ISOs 2 Not available 0 
YISP 40 2002 100 3
                                                 
1 The term used in Borough 2 is ‘drugs warrants’ as opposed to crack house closures. 
 
2 The figure represents referrals from only seven wards funded for the YISP programme.  
3 This figure is includes those who have received an onset which is an assessment used for 
those not in criminal justice system (normally those 8-13 year olds). 
ISSP 40 Not available Not 
available 
 
It was also the case that there were considerable perceived variations in 
the level and types of anti-social behaviour in the different boroughs, 
however these incidents were recorded. Consequently, the type of 
sanctions that were used varied greatly and because different agencies 
often had a different view on the seriousness and impact on different 
forms of anti-social behaviour, different sanctions were often 
recommended. 
 
The lack of clear strategy, together with staff turnover and long-term 
absences in one borough created problems of deploying and 
implementing sanctions. Certain agencies were criticised within the three 
boroughs for not ‘signing up’ to the partnership approach and did not 
regularly attend meetings or engage in the types of intervention that was 
recommended. Although continued reference was made to Section 17 of 
the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, key agencies were conspicuously 
absent from meetings concerned with addressing anti-social behaviour.  
 
The major deficiency, however, was the very low level of monitoring and 
evaluation of anti-social behaviour sanctions. In one borough, there was 
virtually no evaluation of interventions and in the other two the level of 
monitoring and evaluation was poor. In many cases, interventions were 
deemed to have worked if the particular issue which they related to 
decreased, although in the majority of cases, the link was never 
examined. If, following the deployment of certain sanctions, such as 
ABCs or ASBOs the level of anti-social behaviour increased in the areas 
they were issued this was not as a sign of failure but often provided the 
rationale for even greater or more extensive use of these measures. The 
combination of a lack of adequate data, the limitations of data analysis 
and the minimal level of monitoring and evaluation meant that it was 
almost impossible to identify ‘what worked’ let alone ‘why it worked’. 
 
There were, no doubt, some interventions which had some impact. One 
borough had used dispersal orders to address anti-social behaviour around 
train stations which was generally considered to be successful. Another 
borough introduced an alcohol ban in the town centre which was enforced 
by the police with the support from pub landlords and off-licence 
managers which appeared to reduce the problems of street drinking in the 
area, particularly by under age youths, although there was no examination 
of displacement. 
 
The lack of monitoring and evaluation, however, at the local level 
reflected the lack of monitoring and evaluation of anti-social measures by 
the Home Office. The Home Office does not focus on the extent to which 
different local areas are using different interventions with the exception 
of ASBOs and Dispersal Orders, although there is some evidence that 
local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) are making 
increased use of the orders available. The National Audit Office in its 
review of anti-social behaviour concluded that: 
 
“The absence of formal evaluation by the Home Office and the 
impact of providing support services in conjunction with 
interventions prevents local areas targeting interventions in the 
most efficient way to achieve the best outcome for the least cost.” 
(National Audit Office, 2006: 5) 
 
Whether the responsibility for evaluating interventions designed to reduce 
anti-social behaviour is primarily the responsibility of the Home Office or 
local crime reduction partnerships is a moot point. What is clear, 
however, is that there is little clear idea of what works and more 
importantly why and how it works. The limited evaluation of different 
measures, however, becomes even more significant when we recognise 
measures to reduce anti-social behaviour are often used in combination, 
and, in some cases, overlap with criminal sanctions. 
 
Lack of community involvement 
 
The relationship between the CDRP and the local communities in the 
three boroughs examined was found to be at best patchy. Although 
reference was frequently made to ‘community engagement’ such 
engagement was often token and short-lived. One event which was 
organised in one borough, for example, at which members of the 
community were invited to participate in a discussion on crime and ant-
social behaviour nobody turned up. This was mainly because the event 
was poorly organised and local residents were not properly informed. It 
may also be the case that members of the community are less concerned 
about anti-social behaviour than we are led to believe. In another 
borough, several anti-social behaviour community panels were organised 
in four different areas. In all, 20,000 leaflets and letters were sent out and 
advertisements were placed in the local press. An average of 25 people 
turned up to each event. 
 
There was also evidence that anti-social behaviour co-ordinators were 
preoccupied with achieving set targets, organising presentations to the 
CDRP (designed to show how well they were doing) and writing strategy 
documents (although they had very little understanding of ‘what worked’ 
on which to base such a strategy). There was also a sense in which the 
practitioners knew what the ‘real’ problems were and informally 
members of the partnerships expressed disparaging remarks about local 
‘busy bodies’ and those members of the community who persistently 
complained about incidents which the practitioners felt were trivial. 
 
At the same time, members of the community had high expectations of 
the local authorities in the three areas to combat anti-social behaviour and 
were very critical of what they saw as the limited effectiveness of 
different interventions. Local and national media campaigns had no doubt 
increased their expectations and they often expressed frustration at what 
they saw as the inability of the local authority to address these issues and 
improve their quality of life. Residents expected a response to anti-social 
behaviour which they frequently considered it to be too slow or 
misdirected. One typical quote from a resident from one of the boroughs 
claimed: 
 
“We suffer in the long term. The council response is far too slow, 
inefficient and not direct enough. The residents are left in “limbo” 
and sometimes we feel we have to take the law into their own 
hands. The Council are supposed to be given all these new powers 
and that but they are scared of their own shadow. They won’t do 
anything. They keep sending letters saying “we’ll do this, we’ll do 
that” but they never act on it.”  
 
Residents were critical of what they saw as uncoordinated, short-term 
interventions. Residents reported that they were ‘bored and tired’ or 
receiving strategy newsletters. There were complaints about the anti-
social behaviour ‘hotlines’ which simply recorded messages without 
necessarily triggering an intervention. Some residents described how they 
resorted to using the 999 emergency number in order to get a response to 
anti-social behaviour, and even when they reported long delays or limited 
police action. Another resident put it thus: 
 
“We had a lot of hassle from people on the estate, vandalised our 
car, we called the police, and one time we called there were about 
16 kids outside, and they didn’t come. These people were 
threatening my son and I called the police. They didn’t come. 
About an hour later, the police car drives into the car park, and 
leaves. They don’t come to my door and ask, “are you ok?” 
Nothing. I have got no confidence in the police.” 
 
Conclusion 
It is evident that when we ‘drill down’ into the workings of local 
partnerships that there is a considerable gap between the ‘rhetoric’ of 
government-led anti-social behaviour campaigns and their actual 
interpretation and implementation. The major problem with this 
campaign is the quality of the data on which campaigns are mobilised 
coupled with a lack of analysis and evaluation. 
 
Policies do not generally reflect objective problems because it is far from 
clear exactly what the problem is, while there is little understanding of 
‘what works’. There are also issues about the management and sharing of 
data which is available, with all its limitations. The introduction of new 
‘hotlines’ and single non-emergency numbers will predictably compound 
rather than solve the problems of data gathering. 
 
In place of a rigorous and detailed understanding of anti-social behaviour 
there is a great deal of creative accounting taking place with many of 
those involved making exaggerated and unfounded claims about 
‘success’. Where ‘success’ in whatever form can be reasonably claimed 
to have taken place, we do not know that whether it could have been 
better achieved in any other way and at lesser personal and economic 
cost. As the machinery of anti-social behaviour grows in scale it is 
becoming evident that this is not the smooth-running, efficient and 
effective machine that it is often presented as being. 
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